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The motives of foreign direct investments 
(FDIs) have been explained through market- 
and efficiency-seeking in prior literature (e.g., 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). However, the 
foreign operations of multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) have been complicated. Ekholm, 
Forslid, and Markusen (2007) argued the impor-
tance of export-platform FDIs by illustrating 
that some subsidiaries function as platforms to 
export products to third-party countries. Mean-
while, many affiliates are part of international 
production networks, known as “networked 
FDIs” (Baldwin and Okubo, 2014). This view-
point sheds light on third-party country effects 
instead of characteristics of individual-affiliate 
and parent-affiliate pairs. 
Moreover, prior studies have identified deter-
minant factors on the survival of foreign sub-
sidiaries. However, the literature premises that 
profitable subsidiaries are less likely to withdraw 
from host countries (Bradley, Aldrich, Shep-
herd, and Wiklund, 2011). The export-platform 
FDIs literature implies that the premise is not 
necessarily true since MNCs withdraw foreign 
subsidiaries for the purpose of restructuring 
subsidiary networks in the same region or 
throughout the world. Such withdrawals in a 
focal country would have certain influences on 
subsidiary operations in third-party countries. 
This study intends to extend the FDI and sub-
sidiary survival literature by considering third-
party country effects. This study argues that 
the withdrawal of production subsidiaries from 
a focal country influences their operations in 
third-party countries of the same region. FDIs 
by MNCs have been more complicated over the 
past several decades; therefore, networked FDIs 
are critical considerations for understanding 
contemporary subsidiary operations of MNCs. 
According to The Survey on Overseas Business 
Activities by the Research and Statistics Depart-
ment of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI), which is the pres-
ent study’s empirical touchstone, more than 40 
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percent of subsidiaries’ sales are obtained from 
exports to third-party countries. 
Finally, this study answers the following ques-
tion: How do subsidiaries’ withdrawals from 
a focal country influence their operations in 
third-party countries? Using data from Japanese 
affiliates from 1995 to 2013, this study concep-
tualizes networked FDIs and posits that such 
withdrawals from a focal country have positive 
influences on subsidiaries’ sales, purchasing, 
and imports/exports in third-party countries of 
the same region. Furthermore, it presents four 
hypotheses that indicate the importance of view-
ing foreign subsidiaries as a subsidiary network. 
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Traditional theories of internationalization 
have shown that the primary motives of expand-
ing production to foreign countries include 
market accessibility and reductions in transac-
tion and transportation costs (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). In the field of international eco-
nomics, scholars have argued that it is no longer 
relevant to explain the motives of FDIs accord-
ing to two dimensions. For instance, Ekholm, 
Forslid, and Markusen (2007: 793) found that 
export platforms refer to situation outputs of 
foreign affiliates, which are largely exported 
rather than sold in host countries. Blonigen, 
Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2007) theo-
rized that subsidiaries in neighboring or sur-
rounding countries have significant influences 
on FDIs in a host country. Most affiliates pur-
chase some (but not all) of their intermediates 
from abroad, while selling some of their output 
abroad. Baldwin and Okubo (2014) referred to 
these FDIs as “networked FDIs” since these affili-
ates operate as nodes in regional production 
networks. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the amount 
of imports and exports to third-party countries 
(in 3-year increments) from 1995 to 2013. Using 
data from Japanese foreign affiliates, the find-
ings show that approximately 40 percent of sales 
consist of exports to third-party countries, while 
roughly 50 percent of purchases include imports 
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1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Local sales 60.76 60.03 44.13 55.91 61.38 59.84 60.19
Exports to Japan 13.65 14.79 17.85 17.76 21.56 18.96 18.63
Exports to Asia 8.89 9.77 16.89 12.93 9.05 10.24 10.51
Exports to North America 4.06 4.91 7.42 4.22 2.72 3.46 3.29
Exports to Europe 10.07 7.48 10.01 7.04 4.15 5.71 5.45
Exports to other regions 2.57 3.02 3.71 2.14 1.14 1.79 1.94
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Local procurement 44.62 42.08 50.38 47.99 54.98 55.29 57.82
Imports from Japan 33.64 39.00 31.89 31.90 31.36 30.16 24.83
Imports from Asia 10.70 9.13 10.33 12.85 9.33 9.72 10.54
Imports from North America 3.16 3.00 3.07 2.22 1.33 1.56 2.69
Imports from Europe 6.27 5.44 3.00 4.23 2.24 2.40 2.96
Imports from other regions 1.63 1.36 1.33 0.81 0.76 0.87 1.15
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from third-party countries. This evidence clearly 
indicates that considering third-country effects 
is inevitable for a deeper understanding of con-
temporary MNCs’ foreign operations. 
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Prior studies on international management 
have found several determinant factors that 
explain the performance of foreign subsidiaries 
(e.g., Chang, Gong, and Peng, 2012), of which 
two primary factors are headquarters and sub-
sidiary factors. For instance, Tran, Mahnke, and 
Ambos (2010) found that knowledge transfer 
from headquarters to subsidiaries has posi-
tive effects on the subsidiaries’ performance. 
Regarding subsidiary factors, Andersson, Fors-
gren, and Holm (2002) found that a subsidiary’s 
network and its embeddedness in host countries 
have a positive effect on their performance. In 
addition, Gao, Pan, Lu, and Tao (2008) showed 
that specific entry mode experiences have a 
positive impact on subsidiary performance.
Scholars have extended the literature by 
focusing on subsidiaries’ survival (e. g., Berry, 
2010, 2013). The phenomenon of survival has 
been explored from three levels: subsidiary, 
firm, and host country. For instance, Mata and 
Portugal (2002) showed that a subsidiary’s sur-
vival is determined by its size in the context of 
Portuguese firms. In addition, using data from 
Japanese non-financial firms listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, Delios and Beamish (2001) 
found that the survival rates of MNCs’ manufac-
turing subsidiaries in host countries generally 
increase with their local operating experience. 
With regard to firm-level factors and using data 
from 7,166 Swedish firms in the manufacturing 
and technology sectors, Bradley, Aldrich Shep-
herd, and Wiklund (2011) showed that subsid-
iaries have low mortality rates when compared 
with independent organizations. However, their 
mortality rates increase during severe economic 
downturns since independent organizations are 
more capable of using their resources to reduce 
mortality rates during environmental jolts 
when compared with subsidiary organizations. 
Regarding country-level factors and using data 
from 12,992 Japanese foreign affiliates, Delios, 
Xu, and Beamish (2008) showed that the rela-
tion between diversification levels and subsidiar-
ies’ survival rates can differ depending on the 
institutional environment in the host country. 
Subsequently, Song (2014b) found that when 
host market conditions are unfavorable, a small 
investment (instead of a large one) in a foreign 
subsidiary can cause the subsidiary to withdraw. 
Although the aforementioned studies investi-
gated the survival or withdrawal of foreign sub-
sidiaries, they did not consider the potential of 
MNCs’ restructuring effects among subsidiary 
networks (Song, 2015). In fact, Lee and Song 
(2012) conceptualized intra-MNC effects and 
found that an increase (decrease) in production 
in a focal MNC subsidiary can lead to a decrease 
(increase) in production in other subsidiaries of 
the same MNC.
Prior studies on subsidiary performance have 
premised that higher subsidiary failure rates are 
the result of subsidiaries’ lower performance, 
which is a conventional argument in this litera-
ture (Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Montgomery 
and Thomas, 1988). However, the export-
platform and networked-FDI literature indicates 
that this assumption might not be true. There-
fore, the present paper argues that FDIs should 
be viewed as networked FDIs (Baldwin and Oku-
bo, 2014). Subsidiary operations in a focal coun-
try can influence subsidiary operations in third-
party countries and vice versa. In particular, the 
withdrawal of a manufacturing subsidiary from a 
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focal country can influence subsidiaries’ opera-
tions in third-party countries.
???????????????
Since the patterns of FDIs made by MNCs 
have been complicated, MNCs no longer estab-
lish subsidiaries for the sole purpose of market- 
and efficiency-seeking. As shown in Tables 1 and 
2, manufacturing subsidiaries export to other 
subsidiaries in third-party countries rather than 
selling the products in the countries. In addi-
tion, manufacturing subsidiaries import goods 
from third-party countries. Song (2015), in 
fact, found that environmental uncertainty in 
a foreign subsidiary’s host country has positive 
effects on an increase in intra-firm sales to sub-
sidiaries in countries where the uncertainty is 
lower. Furthermore, the decrease of production 
in a focal MNC subsidiary positively influences 
the amount of production in other subsidiaries 
of the same MNC (Lee and Song, 2012). Thus, 
if a manufacturing subsidiary withdraws from 
a focal country, then the import/export func-
tions of the country are partially transferred to 
third-party countries. Consequently, the sales 
and purchases by subsidiaries in the third-party 
countries increase. It suggests that subsidiary 
relationships should be established as subsid-
iary networks instead of individual subsidiaries. 
Moreover, third-party country effects are stron-
ger in the same region since the restructuring 
of production networks in the same region is 
more effective than it is in other regions (Eden 
and Miller, 2004; Ghemawat, 2001). Hence, the 
following hypotheses are posited: 
Hypothesis 1: The withdrawal of a manufactur-
ing subsidiary from a focal country has a positive 
influence on subsidiaries’ total sales in third-party 
countries of the same region. 
Hypothesis 2: The withdrawal of a manufacturing 
subsidiary from a focal country has a positive influ-
ence on subsidiaries’ exports in third-party countries 
of the same region. 
Hypothesis 3: The withdrawal of a manufacturing 
subsidiary from a focal country has a positive influ-
ence on subsidiaries’ total purchasing in third-party 
countries of the same region. 
Hypothesis 4: The withdrawal of a manufactur-
ing subsidiary from a focal country has a positive 
influence on subsidiaries’ imports in third-party 
countries of the same region.
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In order to test the proposed hypotheses, 
firm-level data consisting of subsidiary-level 
sales, imports, and exports is necessary. Thus, 
this study utilizes firm-level data from Japanese 
foreign affiliates included in The Survey on 
Overseas Business Activities by METI, which is 
an annual survey that covers all Japanese affili-
ates in countries around the world. The quality 
of this survey-based data has been justified by 
existing studies (e.g., Makino, Chan, Isobe, and 
Beamish, 2007).
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As stated above, data was obtained from The 
Survey on Overseas Business Activities by METI, 
which covers the period from 1995 to 2013. 
In order to reveal the longitudinal dynamics, 
this study sets the observation period in the 
same time frame and focuses on manufactur-
ing MNCs to test the hypotheses. In addition, it 
excluded firms with no foreign subsidiaries and 
those that lacked certain data. Consequently, 
the final sample covered 8,278 subsidiaries of 
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2,817 MNCs in 99 countries, and it consisted of 
41,042 data points (with the unit of analysis as 
firm-country-year). 
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This study views subsidiaries’ regional sales 
and operations, measured in ten thousand 
dollars, as dependent variables. The Sur-
vey on Overseas Business Activities includes 
subsidiary-level total sales, purchasing, export 
amounts (exports to Japan, North America, 
Asia, Europe, and other regions), and import 
amounts (imports from Japan, North America, 
Asia, Europe, and other regions). In order to 
construct the dependent variables and test the 
hypotheses, we first aggregated the total sales, 
purchasing, and the import/export amounts of 
each MNC subsidiary in a host country. Then, 
we aggregated the country-level variables to 
construct region-level variables. Five regions in 
particular were set (Japan, Asia, North America, 
Europe, and other regions) since these variables 
were readily and empirically available. Finally, 
the country-level data was subtracted from the 
region-level data to create aggregated variables 
in the third-party countries of the same region.
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The independent variables conceptualize the 
withdrawal of manufacturing subsidiaries from 
a focal country. We used the time t-1 data for 
all of the independent and control variables. 
In addition, to measure the withdrawal from 
a focal country, 1 was used if a firm withdrew 
manufacturing subsidiaries from a focal country 
and 0 otherwise. 
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We included two groups of control variables: 
firm and country. We incorporated the number 
of subsidiaries to control the internationaliza-
tion level of firms, while the firms’ total sales 
were employed to control the size of the MNCs 
as a firm-level variable. In addition, the focal 
country’s total sales were used to control the posi-
tion of the country, while the export amounts 
to Japan, North America, Asia, Europe, and other 
regions were applied to control the operation in 
the focal country. These country-level variables 
were incorporated to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
In order to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, the focal 
country’s total purchasing was used along with the 
import amounts from Japan, North America, Asia, 
Europe, and other regions into the focal country. 
These variables were measured in ten thousand 
dollars excluding the number of subsidiaries.
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The dataset in this study consists of unbal-
anced panel data. Hence, unobserved hetero-
geneity might arise since the data contains mul-
tiple observations for each firm. In order to deal 
with unobserved heterogeneity, which causes 
endogeneity problems for estimations, we used 
fixed-effects estimation for all of the models 
(Greene, 1993). In addition, the STATA14 
program estimated the regression by using the 
“xtreg” command with the “fe” option. Finally, 
we lessened the effects of any unobserved het-
erogeneity by incorporating year-dummy vari-
ables since it has been shown that using such 
variables in fixed-effects models can be an effi-
cient means of dealing with heteroscedasticity 
(Sayrs, 1989).
???????????
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and 
correlations of variables that we applied in this 
study. Although some correlation coefficients 
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were relatively high, the highest variance infla-
tion indicator (VIF) was less than 10. Hence, we 
took no remedial action for multicollinearity. 
Using the aggregated amount of operations in 
third-party countries of the same region, Tables 
4 and 5 provide the estimates of the fixed-effects 
regression models.
While Model 1 indicates the estimations of 
the total sales, Models 2 to 6 report the effects 
of the export amounts in third-party countries 
of the same region. Moreover, Models 7–12 in 
Table 5 show the effects of withdrawal on the 
total purchasing and the import amounts in 
third-party countries of the same region. 
In Model 1, withdrawal from the focal coun-
try positively influences subsidiaries’ total sales 
in third-party countries of the same region 
(p < 001), thus suggesting that withdrawal has a 
significant impact on operations in third-party 
countries of the same region. Hence, Hypoth-
esis 1 is supported. In addition, in Models 2–6, 
the independent variable has a positive effect 
on subsidiaries’ exports to Japan, North Amer-
ica, Asia, and other regions from third-party 
countries of the same region (p <. 001; p <. 05). 
Hence, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. 
Model 7 tests Hypothesis 3. Withdrawal from 
the focal country has a positive effect on subsid-
iaries’ total purchasing in third-party countries 
of the same region (p <. 001). Hence, Hypothe-
sis 3 is supported. Moreover, in Models 8–12, the 
independent variable also has a positive impact 
on subsidiaries’ imports from Japan and other 
regions into third-party countries of the same 
region (p <. 001; p <. 05). Therefore, Hypothesis 
4 is partially supported. However, withdrawal 
has a negative effect on import amounts from 
Europe (p <. 01), which suggests that future 
research on the patterns of subsidiary networks 
and their effects can be fruitful. 
In order to deal with any heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation problems in the estima-
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Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Total sales in third-party countries of the same region 559824 4442813 1.000 
2 Withdrawal from the focal country 0.01 0.11 0.070 1.000 
3 Number of subsidiaries 5.06 13.2 0.241 0.044 1.000 
4 Total sales in the focal country 15178 106393 0.355 0.050 0.078 1.000 
5 Exports from the focal country to Japan 1170 12410 0.139 0.032 0.045 0.209 1.000 
6 Exports from the focal country to North America 960 53744 0.238 0.006 0.003 0.616 0.039 1.000 
7 Exports from the focal country to Asia 926 10833 0.281 0.060 0.041 0.208 0.175 0.028 1.000 
8 Exports from the focal country to Europe 898 13471 0.070 0.004 0.056 0.198 0.049 0.023 0.051 1.000 
9 Exports from the focal country to other regions 317 8083 0.090 0.006 0.042 0.168 0.034 0.054 0.107 0.079 1.000 
10 Total purchasing in the focal country 10060 70203 0.359 0.054 0.075 0.938 0.275 0.546 0.233 0.229 0.168 1.000 
11 Imports from Japan into the focal country 2331 17586 0.177 0.035 0.066 0.350 0.165 0.014 0.131 0.164 0.104 0.406 
12 Imports from North America into the focal country 87 1190 0.044 0.004 0.043 0.060 0.014 0.009 0.026 0.025 0.009 0.071 
13 Imports from Asia into the focal country 773 7719 0.278 0.050 0.075 0.210 0.350 0.020 0.299 0.118 0.086 0.269 
14 Imports from Europe into the focal country 344 5273 0.026 0.005 0.041 0.122 0.016 0.001 0.005 0.375 0.011 0.149 
15 Imports from other regions into the focal country 1613 31065 0.297 0.020 0.091 0.085 0.408 0.004 0.085 0.016 0.074 0.119 
16 Firm sales 275881 759646 0.439 0.037 0.223 0.272 0.141 0.053 0.154 0.145 0.098 0.282 
11 12 13 14 15 16
11 1.000 
12 0.081 1.000 
13 0.293 0.062 1.000 
14 0.174 0.055 0.071 1.000 
15 0.061 0.010 0.157 0.001 1.000 
16 0.198 0.111 0.202 0.162 0.196 1.000 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Subsidiaries in the Third-party Countries of the Same Region in Aggregate
Total Sales
Exports to 
Japan
Exports to 
North America
Exports to Asia
Exports to 
Europe
Exports to 
other regions
Withdrawal from the focal country 1136857.7*** 277236.9*** 70645.9* 118685.2*** 17552.4 15252.8*
(152140.8) (26854.1) (27992.7) (23788.4) (12370.5) (7032.8)
Number of subsidiaries 47108.4*** 11839.3*** 893.2** 4400.8*** 588.3*** -60.61
(1696.5) (299.4) (312.1) (265.3) (137.9) (78.42)
Aggregated total sales in the focal country 6.320*** -0.0195 0.860*** 0.0986** -0.197*** -0.0243*
(0.224) (0.0396) (0.0413) (0.0351) (0.0182) (0.0104)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to Japan 14.24*** 4.975*** -0.593* 2.551*** 1.059*** 0.598***
(1.429) (0.252) (0.263) (0.223) (0.116) (0.0660)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to North America 7.716*** 0.205** 6.693*** -0.623*** -0.157*** -0.0577**
(0.401) (0.0708) (0.0738) (0.0627) (0.0326) (0.0185)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to Asia 53.76*** 6.805*** -0.943** 12.60*** -1.760*** 0.293***
(1.610) (0.284) (0.296) (0.252) (0.131) (0.0744)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to Europe -19.39*** -0.800*** -2.166*** -3.217*** 4.393*** -0.704***
(1.262) (0.223) (0.232) (0.197) (0.103) (0.0583)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to other regions -14.53*** 1.757*** -2.215*** -2.558*** -2.398*** 3.374***
(2.069) (0.365) (0.381) (0.324) (0.168) (0.0957)
Firm sales -0.594*** -0.212*** -0.0977*** -0.153*** 0.0146 -0.0456***
(0.104) (0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0162) (0.00844) (0.00480)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 230265.8 19679.0 24408.2 52218.8* 22757.1 15276.2*
(161698.0) (28541.0) (29751.2) (25282.7) (13147.6) (7474.6)
N 41042 41042 41042 41042 41042 41042
Standard errors in parentheses
†p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Subsidiaries in the Third-party Countries of the Same Region in Aggregate
Total 
purchasing
Imports from 
Japan
Imports from 
North America
Imports from 
Asia
Imports from 
Europe
Imports from 
other regions
Withdrawal from the focal country 810136.7*** 316094.0*** 5.651 539.4 -16161.2** 2803.5*
(116387.1) (35257.3) (840.6) (15270.4) (5353.4) (1192.7)
Number of subsidiaries 35988.8*** 14407.4*** -62.14*** -713.7*** -899.8*** -27.75*
(1299.3) (393.6) (9.384) (170.5) (59.76) (13.32)
Aggregated total purchasing in the focal country 10.66*** 0.374*** 0.00480** 0.126*** -0.0215* 0.00893***
(0.209) (0.0634) (0.00151) (0.0275) (0.00962) (0.00214)
Aggregated imports from Japan into the focal country -7.740*** 3.637*** 0.0813*** 0.415*** -0.213*** 0.0329***
(0.835) (0.253) (0.00603) (0.110) (0.0384) (0.00856)
Aggregated imports from North America into the focal country -83.01*** -1.275 2.978*** -14.38*** -4.309*** -0.571***
(10.85) (3.285) (0.0783) (1.423) (0.499) (0.111)
Aggregated imports from Asia into the focal country 54.33*** 20.64*** 0.105*** 12.49*** -1.167*** 0.343***
(1.847) (0.559) (0.0133) (0.242) (0.0849) (0.0189)
Aggregated imports from Europe into the focal country -52.80*** -14.10*** -0.0940*** -7.056*** 4.576*** -0.307***
(2.525) (0.765) (0.0182) (0.331) (0.116) (0.0259)
Aggregated imports from other regions into the focal country -15.77*** -2.207*** -0.0147 -1.061*** 0.132 0.238***
(1.471) (0.446) (0.0106) (0.193) (0.0677) (0.0151)
Firm sales -0.567*** -0.196*** -0.00000356 -0.0119 0.0471*** -0.0233***
(0.0793) (0.0240) (0.000573) (0.0104) (0.00365) (0.000813)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 154863.6 20977.8 1627.6 19387.7 4071.9 6231.6***
(123794.7) (37501.4) (894.1) (16242.3) (5694.1) (1268.6)
N 41042 41042 41042 41042 41042 41042
Standard errors in parentheses
†p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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tions (Wooldridge, 2010), we used feasible 
generalized least squares estimation to verify the 
robustness of the results (Song, 2015). Here, we 
employed the STATA14 to estimate the regres-
sion using the “xtgls” command with the “corr” 
option. Although the details are not reported 
here due to space limitations, the results are 
consistent with those in Tables 4 and 5. 
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This study extended the literature on FDI and 
subsidiary survival by developing an advanced 
mechanism that illustrates networked FDIs 
and analyzing the data of Japanese affiliates in 
manufacturing industries from 1995 to 2013. 
The results show that the withdrawal of produc-
tion subsidiaries from a focal country has a posi-
tive effect on various subsidiaries’ operations in 
third-party countries of the same region. The 
findings imply that the roles of production sub-
sidiaries are transferred to third-party countries 
of the same region, especially when withdrawal 
occurs in a focal country. 
This study advances the understanding of 
the existing literature in several ways. First, it 
contributes to the literature on FDI theory by 
providing evidence regarding the significant 
influences of export-platform and networked 
FDIs on operations in third-party countries. Fur-
thermore, this study extends the literature on 
subsidiary survival. Prior studies have premised 
that subsidiaries survive when they achieve 
higher performance. However, export-platform 
and network FDIs suggest that the withdrawal of 
a subsidiary is consequent to the restructuring 
of MNCs’ global subsidiary networks. 
Besides the findings, this study identifies sev-
eral important areas for future research. First, 
since the samples in this study consist of compa-
nies in the manufacturing sector, the effects of 
withdrawal on operations in third-party coun-
tries might differ depending on types of indus-
tries in manufacturing. For instance, Tables 
6 and 7 present the results of the automotive 
industry, thus suggesting stronger effects of a 
withdrawal on subsidiaries’ aggregated opera-
tions in third-party countries of the same region 
when compared with Tables 4 and 5, thereby 
stressing on the need for future research to 
identify the differences among industries. 
Second, this study focused on the withdrawal 
from a focal country. However, entry into or the 
establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries in 
a focal country should have a negative effect on 
sales and operations in third-party countries of 
the same region. The literature on operational 
flexibility has implicitly considered MNCs shift-
ing production because of environmental uncer-
tainty and the effects of such production shifts 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Song, 2014a). For 
instance, Fisch and Zschoche (2012) found that 
labor cost growth in host countries has a posi-
tive effect on the new establishment of produc-
tion subsidiaries. Thus, it is important for future 
research to identify the differences regarding 
the effects of new establishments and withdraw-
als on operations in third-party countries. More-
over, some events, such as natural disasters, in 
host countries would have a strong impact on 
production networks; thus, comparing such 
subsidiary networks before and after the events 
can offer meaningful insights into the existing 
literature.
Third, this study employs regional operations 
as dependent variables. However, the detailed 
mechanism regarding the proximity of coun-
tries should be examined in future research. For 
instance, a withdrawal from Korea should have a 
significant positive effect on subsidiaries’ opera-
tions in adjacent countries (e.g., China). More-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Subsidiaries in the Third-party Countries of the Same Region in Aggregate
Total Sales
Exports to 
Japan
Exports to 
North America
Exports to Asia
Exports to 
Europe
Exports to 
other regions
Withdrawal from the focal country 5907411.3*** 1300652.3*** 212071.6*** 797438.0*** 179392.5* 105438.2***
(1126034.8) (227943.1) (39437.4) (135523.6) (74614.1) (20427.0)
Number of subsidiaries 126676.4*** 20031.4*** 4009.0*** 2829.6 2110.2* -3506.6***
(14367.5) (2908.4) (503.2) (1729.2) (952.0) (260.6)
Aggregated total sales in the focal country 5.950*** -0.465* -0.0130 -0.413*** -0.350*** -0.0645***
(0.905) (0.183) (0.0317) (0.109) (0.0600) (0.0164)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to Japan 163.0*** 40.51*** 6.794*** 22.20*** 10.06*** 3.171***
(14.67) (2.969) (0.514) (1.765) (0.972) (0.266)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to North America 55.55*** 1.885 -0.117 -0.925 -2.397*** 0.0606
(6.960) (1.409) (0.244) (0.838) (0.461) (0.126)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to Asia 102.2*** 20.03*** 2.656*** 20.51*** -4.010*** 0.555*
(14.45) (2.926) (0.506) (1.740) (0.958) (0.262)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to Europe -29.33*** -3.125* 0.0715 -4.105*** 6.528*** -0.866***
(7.120) (1.441) (0.249) (0.857) (0.472) (0.129)
Aggregated exports from the focal country to other regions -11.93 6.195 -0.145 -3.939 -9.282*** 3.900***
(26.72) (5.409) (0.936) (3.216) (1.771) (0.485)
Firm sales -0.860 -0.154 -0.0227 -0.0549 -0.0157 0.0116
(0.668) (0.135) (0.0234) (0.0804) (0.0443) (0.0121)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 893575.9 118997.2 22499.9 133622.9 77816.6 37274.9**
(796965.7) (161329.7) (27912.3) (95918.6) (52809.1) (14457.5)
N 3464 3464 3464 3464 3464 3464
Standard errors in parentheses
†p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24
Subsidiaries in the Third-party Countries of the Same Region in Aggregate
Total 
purchasing
Imports from 
Japan
Imports from 
North America
Imports from 
Asia
Imports from 
Europe
Imports from 
other regions
Withdrawal from the focal country 5291532.1*** 1818482.1*** 6856.9* 321746.2*** -1404.3 22332.0***
(865865.2) (292366.8) (3073.0) (50040.4) (2513.3) (3463.0)
Number of subsidiaries 88696.5*** 40276.6*** -300.5*** 2997.0*** 590.6*** -1073.5***
(11127.2) (3757.2) (39.49) (643.1) (32.30) (44.50)
Aggregated total purchasing in the focal country 10.21*** 0.518 0.00480 0.0962 0.00291 0.00897*
(0.951) (0.321) (0.00338) (0.0550) (0.00276) (0.00380)
Aggregated imports from Japan into the focal country -17.79* 1.765 -0.0518* 0.722 -0.0149 -0.0829**
(7.051) (2.381) (0.0250) (0.407) (0.0205) (0.0282)
Aggregated imports from North America into the focal country -330.0*** -107.1*** 5.413*** -17.81*** -0.868*** -1.079***
(69.85) (23.59) (0.248) (4.037) (0.203) (0.279)
Aggregated imports from Asia into the focal country 209.6*** 74.74*** 0.469*** 10.65*** -0.150*** 0.729***
(15.05) (5.083) (0.0534) (0.870) (0.0437) (0.0602)
Aggregated imports from Europe into the focal country -105.4*** -29.72*** -0.291*** -6.340*** 0.765*** -0.880***
(19.68) (6.646) (0.0699) (1.138) (0.0571) (0.0787)
Aggregated imports from other regions into the focal country -1980.1*** -689.0*** -0.723 -121.4*** -8.381*** -2.169*
(258.3) (87.22) (0.917) (14.93) (0.750) (1.033)
Firm sales -0.665 -0.237 -0.000915 -0.00801 -0.00223 0.00183
(0.515) (0.174) (0.00183) (0.0297) (0.00149) (0.00206)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 879996.5 155981.3 2754.9 48543.9 1432.3 7228.2**
(613454.1) (207138.0) (2177.2) (35453.0) (1780.6) (2453.5)
N 3464 3464 3464 3464 3464 3464
Standard errors in parentheses
†p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
??????????? ??
????
over, by analyzing these networked FDIs effects, 
it is possible to answer the following question: 
What are the optimal production networks of 
MNCs? Tang and Tikko (1999), for instance, 
explored how operational flexibility, operation-
alized by the number of foreign countries and 
foreign subsidiaries per foreign country, influ-
ences value creation of MNCs. However, we do 
not have any answers to the question (Lee and 
Makhija, 2009).  
This study has several limitations. First, the 
consequences of investments on performance 
are still relatively unknown. Second, this study 
did not consider the organizational interactions 
with competitors and other industry players. 
Prior studies, for instance, have found that orga-
nizations imitate larger and profitable organiza-
tions when considering new market entry (e.g., 
Haveman, 1993). Hence, inadequate consider-
ation of inter-firm relationships is another limi-
tation. 
Regardless of the fact that this study is a work 
in progress, it still provides new insights into the 
current literature besides offering new avenues 
for future research.
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